




ENGLAND, GERMANY AND EUROPE

BY

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a "Life of Bismarck")*




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NEVER has there been so sudden a change in the complexion of a nation as that which took place among us during the first days of August. One week we saw nothing but confusion, irresolution, procrastination; party spirit enraged to an unknown degree; the very foundations of the State undermined, the House of Commons, which is the mainspring in our institutions lamed, civil war imminent. For the first time within the memory of man the authority of Parliament was openly challenged by men in arms. The discipline of the Army had become a question of party politics and men threatened to throw into the cauldron the Crown itself. Look where one would there was no escape, no solution of the unprecedented entanglement. A few days passed and the voice of faction was dead; the two Houses of Parliament at harmony within and united with each other showed themselves to be representatives of a united nation, and for the first time since the death of Pitt we heard from the Treasury Bench in clarion tones the authentic voice of England.

Amid the discordant clamour of our own concerns

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the forebodings of the coming storm had passed unheeded. Who troubled himself about the noisy recriminations of Russian and German newspapers? Who paused to consider the significance of the completion of the Kiel Canal? Even the tragedy of Serajevo stirred but a passing feeling of sympathy—this at least did not concern us. The stories of German hostility seemed too crude and stupid: this was not the sort of stuff that sensible people troubled about. There were not wanting warnings that the troubles in Ireland might have an effect beyond the seas; they were disregarded; we had such warnings too often—with repetition they lost their effect. We were getting tired by prophecies of the coming of the war. Armageddon had been vulgarised; it had become the conventional background for the strident realism of novelists who, having exhausted the actual world, found refuge in fantastic pictures of an imaginary future. We were like spectators in a picture palace; in the security of our island-home we watched a pageant of treaties and war and revolutions pass before our eyes, and we no more thought that it would have effect upon ourselves than we could imagine the figures in the cinematograph suddenly to become alive.

And the revelations which the war has brought are equal to the suddenness with which it arose. How it has illuminated our whole national life! How the forecasts of the prophet of evil have been falsified! It had often been said that with our modern financial system war was in fact impossible, for before a shot was fired the whole structure of society would col-

lapse, and we should begin with universal bankruptcy. The danger was a real one, but it was at once met with resolution and courage, and the crisis passed, not without difficulty and strain, but with singularly little hardship. And then the Army: after all, the lessons of the Boer War had not been lost, and for the first time in our history we were able at once to send abroad a force which, if small in its relative numbers was fully equipped, admirably trained, and able without delay to take a leading part in the line of battle. Those who spoke of the present as a time of decadence should only compare our situation with that at the beginning of the great war with France or the Crimea, should read an account of the fiasco which attended our intervention in the Netherlands in 1793, or the scandals which disgraced the country in 1854. We can have no doubt that within the limits imposed upon our military system by the conditions of our position the time of preparation has been used effectively at the War Office.

The work of the professional soldiers alone has made possible the ready response given by the country to the request for voluntary enlistment of a million men. There was perhaps at first a little hesitation. Some time was necessary before the country could understand the imperative demand for numbers, but as soon as the real nature of the danger was apparent a ready response was assured. It was said that the great centres of population in the North were indifferent: this was quite untrue. The response there has been as ready as in other parts of England, and now that the real nature of the struggle is realised, the

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necessity for continuing it till we have put the last man in the field is understood by all.

All this would not have been possible had the necessity and justice of the war been less clear, had the danger been less overwhelming. It was necessary that the crisis should come with a light so vivid and illuminating that no corner should be left in which party spirit or intellectual superiority could find a lurking place. For this we are indebted to two men : first, and above all, to Sir Edward Grey ; secondly, to the man, whoever he may be, by whom German policy is directed. The honesty, ability, and dignity of the one, the unprecedented blundering, the combined cunning and violence of the other, brought it about that the country was confronted with a situation in which no doubt or hesitation was possible. Even now it is scarcely possible to realise how appalling was the danger from which we escaped, and how fatal would have been the least weakness or delay during the critical days at the beginning of August. Had Italy acted with Germany, had Belgium not opposed the German advance, had England remained neutral, can we doubt that already France would have been irrevocably crushed, the Germans would long ago have been in Paris, the French coast towns would have been bombarded and taken, and what would have been the result ? Belgium would have been helpless in the hands of Germany : her territory would have been preserved, nay it would probably have been increased by a change in the northern frontier of France, but she would have become a vassal State of Germany. Holland would necessarily have been brought into the

German system, and throughout the whole of Central and Western Europe Germany would have ruled without a check or rival, while the whole of the coast from Antwerp to Havre would have become a base for a concentrated attack on England. The Russian advance would not have helped us. Peace could easily have been made with the Tsar by the surrender of some Austrian territory and the Austrian claims in the Balkans, and we should have remained without a friend or ally.

That this was the plan we cannot doubt: it has too often been openly proclaimed. Only one thing was necessary to achieve success—that England should not join in the war until it was too late. For this reason an excuse was found for war which was entirely apart from all British interests; for this reason the moment was chosen when it appeared that our internal troubles must make any vigorous action almost impossible. And this is the explanation of the extraordinary outburst of passion against England, not only on the part of the people but also of the Government of Germany. It would have been a great achievement. It is difficult for us to realise how nearly it was accomplished.

And here it is necessary to add a word of warning. No mistake is more fatal than to despise our enemy. It must not be thought that on the side of the Germans there is less patriotism or self-sacrifice than among us. It does not follow that because the German soldier is compelled to serve he serves less willingly than our men. There are of course in every country some who would gladly escape their duties and responsibilities,

but on the whole the system of compulsory service has been freely and gladly adopted by the whole nation as the necessary condition of its very existence. There, too, when the call to battle comes criticism and discussion cease, and in Germany the danger to the country is, if not more real, at least more obvious. We have always the sea and the navy ; they have no protection except their own right hands ; they have no sea to protect them, they have scarcely a frontier—at the first defeat their soil lies open to invasion ; they have no allies (for Austria is but a second Germany). Isolated and assailed by enemies they stand at bay. The more they are pressed, the fiercer the resistance will be ; for the longer the war lasts the more will it be forced in upon them that the integrity of their country is at stake. The time has not yet come when the truth as to the origin and causes of the war as we see it will be understood by them.

It is not necessary to tell again the story which we now all know so well of the negotiations immediately preceding the outbreak of war—the story told as it has been with simple and compelling sincerity by allowing the facts to speak for themselves. The publication of the White Book was a masterpiece of policy, but it was only a masterpiece of policy because of the honesty and rectitude of purpose which it disclosed. If it did nothing more, it ought finally to refute a fallacy which has been too commonly held. How often have we been told that in diplomatic affairs a State which is governed by popular institutions is at a disadvantage as compared with those which are under monarchical government ? This is, we believe,

profoundly untrue. The very caution which our English system imposes on a Foreign Secretary, the difficulty in taking what is called "a long view," the impossibility of binding a nation for a long time by close engagements to other nations, are in themselves a safeguard against some of the worst dangers of diplomacy. The factions of Parliament are less embarrassing to a Foreign Minister than are the intrigues of a court, and any great statesman will rejoice to know that he is the mouthpiece not merely of a king but of a nation, and that it is by Parliament and the nation as a whole that his actions are to be judged in the present as they will be by history in the future.

There is one other point which a perusal of the White Book and the disclosures of the other Governments suggests—the services of those representatives by whom the country is served abroad. Reading carefully one feels that the Ambassadors of this country were, as we should all assume would be the case, confined in their actions to carrying out loyally the instructions which they received from London. We do not find among them an Ambassador carrying out his own policy. In this country a diplomatist looks for no reward in popular esteem ; like all other civil servants he has to do his work, obey his instructions, and look for his sole reward in the recognition of those who alone know the work that he has done. This is the inevitable result of our system of government, for with us diplomatists can expect no advancement outside the public service : they do not aim at being leaders or ministers or party chiefs. In other countries this is not the case. An Ambassador may

always look forward to replacing his chief, and it is not often that the ablest have been able to resist the temptation of having their own policy which they recommend and further even contrary to the wishes of the home government.

There is of course still much which is obscure as to the immediate causes of the outbreak of war, but all that has been disclosed since only confirms the first impression produced by the publication of the correspondence. It was in Berlin, and in Berlin alone, that the decision was made. The best proof of this is an analysis of the statements put forward on the German side. We have the German White Book, and also a very remarkable pamphlet published in Germany for distribution in America which was specially prepared for the German tourists on their return home. In both of these, and in all other statements of the German case, the responsibility for the outbreak of war is thrown upon Russia, but always on the one ground of the Russian mobilisation. We get the issue brought down to a simple formula : Austria made war upon Servia ; Russia began to mobilise for the defence of Servia against Austria ; conversations and correspondence with a view to limiting the field of war were continuing, when suddenly there comes from Berlin a complaint that the Russians are mobilising not only against Austria but also against Germany, and this is almost immediately followed by a peremptory ultimatum requiring that the mobilisation should be stopped. Surely there is no one who could be deceived by this. It is mere common form, a stereotyped gambit. The whole military arrangements of

Germany have been with extraordinary ability so arranged that the transition from peace to war footing can be made in the shortest possible time ; from the time of Frederick the Great it has always been the traditional policy of the Prussian General Staff to get in the first blow ; Frederick attacked Austria in a time of profound peace without declaration of war ; in 1866 Prussian troops crossed the Hanoverian frontier some hours before any declaration of war had been made. In modern times, when moral forces count so much, it is necessary to find some excuse for the sudden blow, this thunderbolt from a clear sky. This is easily found in a complaint that the other nations are making their preparations to parry the blow. The same thing happened in 1866. Prussia had determined for other reasons on war with Austria ; Austria knew this and was preparing in defence ; the first movements of troops, whether true or false, reported to Berlin were made the ground of an official complaint, and it was on this that the outbreak of war was justified.

It is only by reading the statements put forward in Germany that the weakness of the German case can be fully appreciated. We have the " Truth about Germany : Facts about the War." This is issued under the authority of a committee which numbers among its members not only Prince Bülow and General von der Goltz, the former Imperial Chancellor and the most distinguished of German military writers, but what will arouse more interest among many—the names of Dryander, Harnack, Wundt, and Wilamowitz-Moellendorf. Here in a work especially

written for American readers we might hope to get a worthy and considered statement of the German case. The crucial matter is Belgium, for it cannot be too often insisted on that it was the invasion of Belgium which was the one definite and conclusive reason for England joining in the war : all else might have been arranged. Now how is this treated ? The following passages will show :—

“ Before one German soldier had crossed the German frontier, a large number of French aeroplanes came flying into our country across the neutral territory of Belgium and Luxemburg without a word of warning on the part of the Belgian Government. At the same time the German Government learned that the French were about to enter Belgium. Then our Government with great reluctance had to decide upon requesting the Belgian Government to allow our troops to march through its territory. Belgium was to be indemnified after the war, was to retain its sovereignty and integrity. Belgium protested, at the same time allowing, by an agreement with France, that the French troops might enter Belgium. After all this, and not till France and Belgium itself had broken the neutrality, our troops entered the neutral territory.¹ Germany wanted nothing from Belgium, but had to prevent that Belgian soil being used as a gate of entrance into German territory.”²

“ Great Britain asked in return for its neutrality that the German forces should not enter Belgium. In other words, it asked that Germany should allow the French and Belgian troops to form on Belgian territory for a march against our frontier ? This we could not allow. It would have been suicidal.”³

“ The German troops, with their iron discipline, will

¹ The statement has since been officially and categorically contradicted by the Foreign Office.

² “ The Truth about Germany,” p. 18.

³ *Ib.*, p. 19.

respect the personal liberty and property of the individual in Belgium, just as they did in France in 1870."

"The Belgians would have been wise if they had permitted the passage of the German troops. They would have preserved their integrity, and besides that, would have fared well from the business point of view, for the army would have proved a good customer and paid cash."¹

Would it be believed that in the whole pamphlet there is not a single reference to the fact that England had asked for and obtained from France an assurance that Belgian neutrality should not be violated, and that the request to France was exactly similar to that sent to Germany? Instead of this there is the constant repetition of charges for which no evidence of any kind is forthcoming, such as that the neutrality of Belgium had as a matter of fact been violated. These statements are entirely inconsistent with the statement made by the Chancellor and Secretary of State at Berlin: it gave what is no doubt the true reason—that no answer could be given to the British inquiry as to Belgian neutrality because any such answer might disclose their strategical plans. But those plans had not been made in the last few days, and this answer is itself conclusive evidence for the fact that, as everyone knew, the invasion of France by the way of Belgium had long ago been determined on by the German General Staff. The Army decided: it was left to the civilians after the event to put forward what justification they like.²

¹ "The Truth about Germany," p. 45.

² Since the above was written numerous other pamphlets by Germans of distinction have appeared. It is not possible now to deal with them fully, but all of them have much in common. In

It is not surprising therefore that the Germans lay stress not on that which was the actual reason for England joining the Allies, but usually content themselves with a general indictment of the course of British policy in the years before the war.

The chief accusation made against British policy is that we have allowed ourselves to become entangled in an artificial system of alliances based on a fundamentally false conception of what is called "the balance of power." Even in England well-informed writers have taken the opportunity for declaiming against the whole system of "the balance of power." It is suggested that the justice of our position cannot be defined merely by an analysis of Sir Edward Grey's action during the few days before the outbreak of war. His whole policy during these critical days was, it is said, conditioned and limited by the general course of policy which had been pursued during the last ten years. It is no good saying that in the supreme crisis he used every effort to avoid the impending catastrophe ; it is necessary to show that he had not, by

particular all treat the neutrality of Belgium as if it were of no importance. For example, Professor Wagner writes : "Then came the British declaration of war. The incredible had happened, justified by the most worthless excuse, the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany while all had been arranged with France and Russia." Professor Harnack writes : "I cannot recognise that there has been even a formal wrong ; for we were in a position in which formalities no longer exist, but only moral duties." All attribute the war to the intrigues of England with France and Russia, but none meet the point that the whole crisis arose from the unprecedented violence of the Austrian Note to Servia. All state that Belgian neutrality had already been violated, but none give any proof of this : and all shew an intense hatred of England.

a mistaken course of policy before, allowed himself to be inveigled into a position which this country ought never to have assumed.

Now first of all let us consider for a moment what is meant by "the balance of power"—the thing, and not merely the word. The expression is originally a technical term applied to the very artificial system of alliances that prevailed during the first part of the eighteenth century, a time when foreign policy in all European States was perhaps at its lowest ebb, for it was a time above all others when the States of Europe were guided not by great national aims, not by great ideas of religion or policy, but by dynastic interests. The term, however, is a useful one, and has become prominent just because it represents a profound truth.

If we stand aside and look at Europe from a distance, with the eye of an historian or the dweller in another continent, we see a number of different states of which each, with few, if any, exceptions, represents a nation ; each of these national states is the guardian and shrine within which are preserved the whole of national life. The peculiarity of Europe, as compared with the great civilised empires of the past, as compared with the Roman Empire, with China, or even with the United States of America, is variety in unity. These states have the unity of a common past, a common religion, a common civilisation, and the consciousness of this unity is always present among them ; but within this unity there are endless varieties of detail, and it is the interplay of the various states and the life of the various nations on one another

which prevents the deadness which, in other times and other regions, has grown from uniformity. The welfare of Europe, the hopes of the future, the possibility of progress require the maintenance of this variety, and in the long run the establishment of a common Government for the whole of Europe would bring with it death and decay. This has always been felt and understood. From time to time there has arisen a state, or alliance of states, so powerful that it has threatened the existence of the weaker and aimed at universal domination. When such a time has arisen, it has always been necessary for the other nations of Europe to band themselves together against the common danger. This was the case with the Spanish Empire under Charles V. and Philip II.; it happened again when Louis XIV., and after him Napoleon, attempted to impose, by the strength of French armies, French habits of thought and French civilisation upon the whole of Europe. Whenever in the past such a situation has arisen, it has always been found that England has taken the lead in the coalition against the predominant state.

That the danger in the past has not been an imaginary one, the history of the Spanish Netherlands, the history of the whole of Western Germany, the century-long degradation of Italy, and the destruction of Polish nationality will show.

The policy of "the balance of power" has been always, not exactly to crush a predominant state, but to avert the danger by preventing any single Power, or group of Powers, even attaining a position in which it might be a danger to the others. There have been

times when for a few years no such danger has been apparent, but they are few, and in the ceaseless ebb and flow of diplomacy there has always been, and must be, constant watchfulness against anything which would endanger the liberties of Europe.

The real question we have to ask ourselves is whether, during the last thirty years, there has, or has not, arisen a state of things which presented a danger to European liberty. If there has, then England has merely been pursuing with ample justification the policy which has always been hers since she took a part as an independent nation in the councils of Europe.

Can there be any doubt as to the answer ? The aim of Germany has been again and again openly avowed : it is nothing less than predominance on the continent of Europe combined with a leading position at sea—the combination which Canning had to meet when he “called a new world into existence to redress the balance of the Old.” On the Continent the predominance would be based on the alliance with Austria, and around this would be grouped the smaller vassal states—Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Servia, Switzerland. This is the real meaning of the expression—the Federated States of Europe—which has recently made its appearance in German works. When we say that this was the avowed object of German ambition, we do not mean that it had ever been officially proclaimed as the policy of the Government. That is not the way in which things are done. It may be that no single Minister has ever put it forward as the immediate object to be attained. We mean that

it was the end to which the whole national development was rushing with a force and impetuosity which no Minister could check. It was a system in which indeed the work of the Government would be only to complete by force of arms what had already been half finished by organised enterprise. German trade, German settlers, German books had prepared the way, and when the time came it would only be necessary for German arms to gather in the crop which was already ripe for harvest—just as the conquests of Louis XIV. went hand in hand with the spread of French taste, literature, and society.

It is the avowed and open policy of the forward school of German politicians to destroy the traditional freedom of Europe. As against this doctrine of the Balance of Power they put forward that of the Unity of Europe, a unity that is to be won by the defeat of the common foe. For they delight in picturing England as “the enemy of Europe.” “Differences between European States benefit only the common enemy of the world.”

“We must put aside all such notions of equilibrium. In its present distorted form it is opposed to our weightiest common interests. It is not now a question of a European state system, but of one embracing all the states of the world, in which the equilibrium is established on real factors of power. We must endeavour to obtain in this system our merited position at the head of a federation of Central European states, and thus reduce the imaginary European equilibrium in one way or another to its true value, and correspondingly to increase our own power.”

What this means in simpler language is that Germany shall, based on the alliance with Austria

and Italy, establish itself as the leader and ruler of Europe just as Napoleon did, and impose its will on all the subordinate countries.

A few months ago this might have been regarded merely as the far-fetched dream of a rather pedantic writer. What a flood of light has been thrown on it by the events of the last month !

Looking back at the events of the last few years we can now see more clearly than at the time that in these alliances was to be found the only means of preserving peace. The pressure from Germany was so strong and persistent that it could not be held back by anything short of an actual superiority of force. As the German Chancellor said in 1911 : " The dominant chord of the passionate feeling which prevails in wide circles is the will of Germany to assert herself in the world with all her strength and capacity." This is a true word. It is the constant self-assertion of Germany, in season and out of season, which has led to the unrest and apprehensions which for fifteen years have disturbed Europe. The inevitable result of it has been that all those states whose interests and very existence were menaced have tried to find some security by joining in agreements with one another. How absurd it is to throw the responsibility for this on a single ruler or statesman ! All that any man could do was to find the proper means for carrying into effect arrangements which were really dictated by the general welfare of Europe.

It is now some fifteen years since the development of German policy and the unfolding of German ambitions ordained that Great Britain should once

more take a leading part in the affairs of the Continent. This war is the direct and immediate sequel to the Boer War. We have forgotten, if we ever understood, how events which with us have been overshadowed by the later reconciliation stirred the whole of Germany, and stirred much that was best in the national feeling. It may be interesting to quote a passage from the latest account of German policy written by one of the best-informed of German publicists—Count Reventlow—which was published only a few weeks ago.¹

“The feeling in Germany was strengthened and embittered by the violent attacks which public opinion continued to direct against British policy in South Africa, and the manner in which the war was conducted. The suffering of the Boer women and children in the concentration camps together with other hardships and cruelties had raised the hatred on the German side to a high degree and kept it permanently at this pitch² . . . In this outburst there joined together at once and overflowed all the accumulations of the last ten years in the feeling that the nation had been over-reached, had been insulted, in recollections of real or supposed political failure. To all else there had been added the feeling of impotence. The voluminous literature of these years shows, one might say, on every page the thought and the hope that one day the reckoning with England would come.”

The feeling of impotence and unsucccess was indeed a natural one. Let us recollect the excitement and

¹ Count Reventlow, “Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik, 1888–1913,” p. 171.

² Count Reventlow in a later passage confesses that the accounts current in Germany were untrue, and that there was no real ground for the attacks on the conduct of our army. *Ibid.*, p. 173.

enthusiasm caused in Germany by the Emperor's telegram to President Kruger, and the almost farcical result when the German Government had to confess that however much it might wish to do so it was incapable of stirring a finger to help the Boers. This impotence arose from a double cause : the first was the diplomatic isolation of Germany, whose only sure ally was Austria, and in a war with England Austria was useless ; the other cause was the weakness of Germany at sea. For many years a strong party had been urging the completion of a fleet which would be useful not only for home defence but on the high seas ; they had found little support. From the year 1900 all was changed. From this time we must date the fixed determination to found a fleet which was meant to be used, and used against England. The movement was in every way a national one ; it is not the case that the Government is solely responsible for it ; there have been many occasions when the national unrest, the impatience, the clamour for a strong and active policy have been an embarrassment to the Government, who saw themselves unable to satisfy the demands made upon them. The German position was indeed a difficult one ; the alliance with Austria made impossible any good understanding with Russia ; with France there was no hope of anything except at best distant courtesy ; the loyalty of Italy to the Triple Alliance had long been doubtful, and the expedition to Tripoli in reality cut the last thread ; from that time Italy could not afford, even if she wished, to risk a war with England and France, whose fleets controlled the Mediterranean,

and she had alienated Turkey ; but a good understanding with Turkey was one of the best cards in the German policy. This isolation of Germany is generally attributed by German writers to the genius and foresight of Edward VII. Is it not more natural to attribute it to the defects of their own policy ? For the last twenty years the policy of Germany has indeed displayed every fault. In a position where restraint, dignity, caution, reserve seemed to be dictated, they have been adventurous, unstable, quarrelsome, interfering. In no part of the world could a treaty be made or arrangements discussed but the voice of Germany was heard declaring with unnecessary emphasis that no arrangement could be made without her being consulted. Whether it was in China or a Persian Railway, or Morocco, or South Africa, or the West Indies, everywhere we find the same thing. The result inevitably was to alienate and alarm each nation in turn, and thereby to create the understandings by which each nation knew that it could reckon on the support of others.

The task of German statesmen was a difficult one. It was rendered more difficult by the spirit which was arising among the younger generation. Living in a time of unprecedented material progress they were reaping the crop which had been sown and tended by the wisdom and abilities of their fathers. The discoveries and inventions of the modern world in which they themselves bore so distinguished a part seemed to have completed the subjugation of nature to man. With an industry and persistence to which we may give full recognition everything was used for the

furtherance of national prosperity and power. And at last the discovery of the airship and the submarine seemed to have given them that for which they had searched so long, the means for wresting from England the control over the sea. If this could be secured the last obstacle to the primacy of Germany among the nations of the world would be removed. To this we must add the teaching of a philosophy which saw the highest end of man in the unrestrained use of power, or shall we say violence?—for it is the weakness of German thought that it often fails to distinguish between the two.

What we see in Germany is a state of mind which has often been described before. It was something more common in the earlier ages of civilisation than in later days. The Jewish prophets knew it well, they knew it in great military empires of Asia, we can still see it depicted on the Assyrian monuments when the king is represented with his feet on the necks of his conquered slaves. They knew it in the feeble and foolish imitations of it among the Jewish kings, and the whole history of the Jewish nation is a protest against the cruel arrogance of dominion. The Greeks knew it and called it *ὑβρις*, the whole burden of Greek thought as of Jewish prophecy is the Nemesis that comes to those who forget in the days of their power and prosperity the power of the gods. It is this that armed Antigone against Creon as it armed the Athenians at Salamis, and the *Persae* is an exercise on this theme. It was the pride of power which made the tyrants the embodiment of evil, and it was only when Athens became a tyrant city that Greece united

against her. To use your force to the uttermost, to enforce your will on others, this is the ideal of Young Germany. It is an ideal which we may be well content to oppose to the death, for the attainment of it is destruction to the conquerors as to the conquered.

There have been occasions when a war between two great nations has brought about a better understanding, and on the battle-field they have learned to honour and respect each other. It was the hope of many that once more this might be so. This was the spirit in which this nation entered on the struggle. The omens so far have not been good. Perhaps it is not too late to hope that as the struggle continues the first ebullition of violence, arrogance, and petulance will exhaust itself, and the German nation will begin to recognise something of the spirit by which those who have met their challenge are moved. The time is not yet—but if this is achieved, the death and destruction will not have been all in vain.

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